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Abstract
Since 1990 there have been cases of patients infected by influenza caused by Low Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza. However, since 1997, highly pathogenic viruses, such as A/H5N1, have caused an increase 
in the number of people infected via zoonotic transmission. Infected patients have constitutional and 
mainly respiratory symptoms, hematological disorders and liver dysfunction. About half of patients 
are under 20 years and about 90% under 40 years. In recent studies in mammals it seems that only 
few mutations in viral genome are necessary to confer the virus the ability to infect mammalian cells. 
In response to these studies, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) propose continuous researches 
without alerting the health care system, because, at present, there is not a global threat. Moreover, in 
the future, this issue would take place as a major concern from the point of view of public health; it 
could be the next pandemic. Due to the high human mortality rate occurring in cases of patients in-
fected with this virus, an outbreak or pandemic would require proper knowledge of the biology of the 
avian influenza virus, the determinants of pathogenicity, prevention through vaccination and possible 
new treatment regimens.
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INFLUENZA H5N1 - PRÓXIMA PANDEMIA?
Resumen
Desde 1990 se han reportado casos de pacientes infectados por influenza causadas por virus de baja 
patogenicidad, sin embargo, desde el año 1997, virus altamente patógenos como el A/H5N1 han 
provocado un aumento en el número de personas infectadas por transmisión zoonotica. Los pacientes 
infectados presentan síntomas constitucionales y respiratorios, trastornos hematológicos y disfunción 
hepática. Cerca de la mitad de casos son pacientes menores de 20 años, y aproximadamente el 90% 
son menores de 40 años. Recientes estudios en mamíferos indican que son necesarias algunas mu-
taciones en el genoma viral para que el virus tenga la capacidad de infectar células mamíferas. En 
respuesta a estos estudios el centro de control de enfermedades (por sus siglas en ingles Centers for 
Disease Control), ente regulador en la dinámica epidemiológica mundial propone continuar con las 
investigaciones sin alertar a los sistemas de salud, pues en este momento no constituye una amenaza 
mundial. Sin embargo, este aspecto toma lugar como una preocupación importante desde el punto 
de vista de la salud pública, por cuanto podría constituir la próxima pandemia. Debido a la alta mor-
talidad en humanos que se presenta en los casos de pacientes infectados con este virus, un brote o 
una pandemia exigirán por tanto un conocimiento apropiado de la biología del virus de la influenza 
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aviar, los determinantes de su patogenicidad, la prevención mediante vacuna y los posibles esquemas 
de tratamiento.
Palabras clave: Influenza, Transmisión, Pandemias, subtipo H5N1
INFLUENZA H5N1 - PANDEMIA PRÓXIMO?
Resumo
Desde 1990 se têm reportado casos de pacientes infectados por influenza causadas por vírus de baixa 
patogenicidade, porém, desde o ano 1997, vírus altamente patógenos como o A/H5N1 têm provocado 
um aumento no número de pessoas infectadas por transmissão zoonótica. Os pacientes infectados 
apresentam sintomas constitucionais e respiratórios, transtornos hematológicos e disfunção hepática. 
Cerca dametade de casos são pacientes menores de 20 anos, e aproximadamente o 90% são menores 
de 40 anos. Recentes estudos em mamíferos indicam que são necessárias algumas mutações no genoma 
viral para que o vírustenha a capacidade de infectar células mamíferas. Em resposta a estes estudos o 
centro de controle de doenças (por suas siglas em inglês: Centers for Disease Controle), ente regulador 
na dinâmica epidemiológica mundial propõe continuar com as pesquisassem alertar aos sistemas de 
saúde, pois em este momento não constituiu maameaça mundial. Porém, este aspecto toma lugar 
como uma preocupação importante desde o ponto de vista dasaúde pública, já que poderia constituir 
a próxima pandemia. Devido à alta mortalidade em humanos que se apresenta nos casos de pacientes 
infectados com este vírus, um surto ou uma pandemia, exigirão por tanto um conhecimento apropriado 
da biologia do vírus da influenza aviar, os determinantes dasua patogenicidade, a prevenção mediante 
vacinae os possíveis esquemas de tratamento.
Palavras chave: Influenza, Transmissão, Pandemias, subtipo H5N1
Introduction
Since 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
reported about 600 human infections by H5N1 in-
fluenza virus in 15 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe 
and the Near East, with an associated mortality rate 
approaching 60% (1,2).
In 2011, there were 62 cases and 34 deaths in humans 
attributable to H5N1 in five countries (Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, China, Egypt and Indonesia) and recent 
outbreaks have occurred in poultry in Bangladesh, 
China, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Vietnam (1,3).
Antigenic variation in surface glycoproteins of the virus, 
known as Hemagglutinin HA and Neuraminidase NA, 
are responsible for adaptability to hosts other than 
birds. Infected people start the clinical picture with 
high fever and presence of lower respiratory tract 
symptoms. Some patients have diarrhea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, pleuritic pain and nosebleeds. The 
early detection of H5N1 flu cases will be critical for 
the proper monitoring of the pandemic, treatment of 
patients, isolation measures to reduce transmission and 
introduction of immunoprophylaxis (2,4).
The aim of this review is to acquire knowledge about 
the past, present and future of Influenza H5N1 virus 
and possible pandemic in light of the latest scientific 
advances in the field of influenza virus.
Epidemiology
The influenza virus has well known animal reservoirs 
such as pigs, horses, sea mammals and birds; however 
the latter are considered the natural reservoir of all 
subtypes, and although the incidence of human in-
fection by avian virus is low, since 1997 the possibility 
of transmitting avian influenza to humans has been 
recognized, however, no studies of seroprevalence 
have been conducted to recognize the reality facing 
of avian influenza H5N1 strains in humans (5,6,7,8).
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The Report of the World Health Organization, in January 
2013, recorded human infections attributable to H5N1 
from 2003 to January 2013 as follows: 610 cases with 
360 deaths (59%), Figure 1 (1,9).
It is well known to mankind the impact of influenza 
virus throughout many epidemics, especially caused 
by H2N2 strain in 1957, H3N2 in 1968, H1N1 in 1977 
and 2009, and in animals with human transmission of 
H5N1 in 1997 and H9N2 in 1999 (5,10,11,12).
The first reported case of human infection (May 1997-
Hong Kong) with influenza A H5N1 was in a 3 year 
old boy who presented odynophagia, fever and cough, 
being recorded a total of 18 cases that year, re-emerging 
in 2003 by a different strain; 11 patients between 1998 
and 1999 were infected with H9N2 with benign clinical 
course than produced in 1997 by H5N1. Other viruses 
such as H1N2 and H7N7 have been associated with 
human conjunctivitis and flu symptoms, but with low 
mortality rate (5,12,13).
In 2004, the influenza A H5N1 virus affected eight 
countries with a mortality near 80%, where every 
patient involved had close contact with poultry. The 
Ungchusak study published in 2005 using RT-PCR 
(retro-transcriptase polimerase chain reaction) reported 
the eventual person to person transmission of this virus 
and warned about the possibility that a new variant 
that can be transmitted human to human could be 
generated through mutations or gene rearrangements. 
This virus H5N1/2004 is antigenically different from the 
1997 strain, indicating that this variant arose in a short 
time adapting to humans by mutation or recombination 
(12,14,15,16).
It is important to keep in mind that mankind has 
transcended four pandemics of influenza virus. The 
possibility that influenza virus strains, as the case of A 
H1N1/2009 and others, have a deep impact worldwide 
is certain; the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated 
at that time that implementation of a vaccine against 
this viral strain is essential as well as considering it for 
other types such as H5N1 virus (5,17,18).
Etiology
Avian flu is an infectious disease caused by an Or-
thomyxoviridae (Greek orthos: ‘standard, right’, and 
myxo: ‘mucus’) virus, known as influenza virus type 
A (19,20,21). The virus is a single-stranded RNA of 
negative polarity and pleomorphic appearance, with 
an average diameter of 120 nm which replicates with 
no mechanism of RNA protection, being frequent the 
alterations in genome. An unique feature of these viruses 
is that they are segmented. The virus adheres to the 
cells easily through a surface glycoprotein known as 
hemagglutinin (HA), from which 16 different types are 
known (5,18,22). Another feature becomes to its ability 
to leave the infected cell due to the surface glycoprotein 
neuraminidase (NA - 9 types are known). There are 
144 possible combinations of influenza virus type A 
(21,23). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the virus 
must meet three requirements to be considered with 
pandemic potential: enter and replicate in the human 
body, cause disease, and easily be transmitted from 
person to person (20,21).
Studies have shown that there are two clinical forms 
of avian flu. The mild form is produced by low patho-
genic strains designated LPAI (Low Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza), while lethal forms are caused by highly 
pathogenic strains or HPAI (High Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza). The difference between them can be set 
initially by subtyping; the only subtypes showing HPAI 
pattern are H5 and H7. Besides subtyping, it is necessary 
to demonstrate in vivo the lethality of the strains in a 
laboratory assay in which 4 to 6-week old chickens are 
inoculated intravenously; if resulting mortality rate is 
75% or more, the strain is considered HPAI (20,21).
The virus has many proteins such as polymerase, 
hemagglutinin (HA), nucleocapsid protein (NP), neur-
aminidase (NA), and matrix protein (M) as M2 which 
acts as an ion channel maintaining stable pH of the 
endosome and nonstructural proteins (NS). The activity 
of the RNA polymerase, which is formed by PB2, PB1 
and PA, is responsible for replication and transcrip-
tion. This enzyme has an endonuclease activity and 
is linked to RiboNucleo Protein: RNP. The NS1 and 
NS2 proteins have regulatory function to promote 
the synthesis of viral components in the infected cell. 
Hemagglutinin (HA) is a glycoprotein which contains 
2 to 3 glycosylation sites and serves as a receptor to 
sialic acid (N-acetyl-neuraminic acid) and induces 
penetration of the viral particles by fusion to host cell 
membrane. HA is the major antigenic site of influenza 
virus. Mutations in this protein reduce or inhibit the 
binding of neutralizing antibodies, emerging new sub-
types through two phenomena known as antigenic drift 
and antigenic shift. Antigenic drift is the explanation of 
seasonal epidemics but antigenic shift, which is called 
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genomic rearrangement, occurs for example when H1 is 
replaced by H5 and results in the formation of a mosaic 
virus; this can occur when the cell is infected with two 
different viruses at the same time and their genomic 
segments are exchanged during replication (20,21).
In humans, influenza strains preferentially recognize 
receptors formed by oligosaccharid Siaα2,6Gal. On the 
other hand, avian and equine influenza strains preferen-
tially recognize the receptor Siaα2,3Gal. Consequently, 
influenza strains infect tissues in various species as a 
function of the presence or predominance of these types 
of receptors. Human respiratory epithelial cells contain 
predominantly Siaα2,6Gal while airway of horses and 
intestinal tract of ducks (where avian strains replicate) 
contain mostly remains of Siaα2,3Gal. Interestingly, the 
respiratory tract of pigs contain both types of receptors, 
which explains their susceptibility both to avian and 
human strains (20,21,24,25).
A major factor that determine the susceptibility of host 
is the presence of these sialic residues in different cells 
and tissues of each animal species, since all avian 
strains have Glu (glutamic acid), whereas all human 
strains (H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2) possess Lys (lysine). 
Therefore, the appearance of Lys in HA of an avian 
strain is considered an adaptive mutation to mam-
malian cells. So far, they have only been detected in 
avian strains isolated from infected human patients. 
The other major glycoprotein, neuraminidase (NA), 
catalyzes the glycosidic bonds with sialic acid, action 
involved in the release of virions from infected cells. 
The antigenic drift can occur in the NA and it may de-
termine resistance to NA inhibitors such as oseltamivir 
and zanamivir (26).
Studies by Li et al have shown that about 50% of the 
H5N1 strains recovered post-infection from the mouse 
lungs had the substitution of Glu for Lys. Furthermore, 
mutations at position 701 of PB2 gene seem to deter-
mine or facilitate the ability of avian influenza strains 
to cross the species barrier and replicate in mammals. 
The acquisition of an Asn (asparagine) instead of Asp 
(aspartic acid) (Asp701Asn) was already observed 
in avian H7N7 strains adapted to mouse lung cell 
lines and mouse-adapted human strains. The most 
important aspect is that mutation Asp701Asn could 
normally occur spontaneously in H5N1 influenza 
strains, facilitating the transmission of these strains to 
mammals (5,26).
Pathophysiology
Infection involves transfer of respiratory secretions or 
indirect contact (fomites) from an infected individual 
to another. It is essential to remember that H5N1 virus 
has a high survivability in the environment (26).
The incubation period is 2-5 days, although other 
studies indicate periods of up to eight days It is 
important to analyze patients who have traveled to 
endemic areas 7-14 days prior to symptoms onset 
or those with close contact with sick travelers from 
endemic countries (12).
Once the virus is in respiratory tract epithelium, it 
may adhere and penetrate cells giving rise to viral 
replication (12).
As mentioned before the potential pandemic viruses 
have the following features: replicate in the human body, 
cause disease, and are easily transmitted from person to 
person. The literature indicates that the influenza virus 
with the greatest pandemic potential today is the H5N1 
subtype, which has met the first two conditions (5).
Due to the presence of changes in the two major surface 
glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA), the influenza virus is able to elude the immune 
response (5).
The influenza virus binds to the cell by HA interaction 
with a glycoprotein receptor on the cell surface, as pre-
viously described. Only the hemagglutinin is recognized 
by trypsin, a respiratory and digestive tract protein of 
the host cells, allowing the invasion of these tissues and 
explaining why HA antigen is a key protein responsible 
for adherence to susceptible cells (12,27).
The entry of the virus occurs by endocytosis, where 
merging with a lysosome occurs to causing decrease 
in pH and structural changes in haemagglutinin. Later, 
it will interact with the nuclear membrane thus being 
able to enter the nucleus of the viral genome. In the 
same way, some nucleoproteins have affinity for a 
series of intermediates which interact with the nuclear 
pore complex allowing access to the nucleus. This 
only occurs if these nucleoproteins are free and not 
associated with matrix proteins (28).
Polymerase begins the transcription of viral Messenger 
RNA using this process for translation of early viral 
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proteins NP and NS1, and then translation of the host 
messenger RNA is blocked. It generates an accumulation 
of NP thus triggering viral RNA synthesis. Secondary 
transcription generates late translation proteins such 
as M1, HA and NA; the last two are assembled in 
the cytoplasm and transported to surface where are 
integrated into cellular membrane. The nucleocapsid 
is enclosed by M proteins, and viral particles leave the 
cell through the cell membrane with their envelope 
together with surface glycoproteins (7,29).
The disease is originated from the immune system 
and caused in response to infection by the release of 
cytokines and endocrine activation (30,31).
Viruses particles are trapped by the mucociliary layer in 
the upper respiratory tract. If the viruses elude it, they 
reach the alveoli where macrophages or dendritic cells 
could destroy them (31).
In flu infection, cells of the innate immune system are 
activated by the presence of viral RNA; this activation 
is mediated by Toll Like Receptor 8 – TLR8 (31).
The released cytokines and chemokines attract the ef-
fector cells of the immune response such as neutrophils, 
monocytes, plasmacytoid cells, and dendritic cells to 
the alveoli (31,32).
The major cytokines are IL-1, TNF-alpha, IL.6, IFN, 
IL-8, macrophage inflammatory protein (MIP-1) as well 
as acute phase proteins. The synthesis of acute phase 
proteins in liver is triggered by the presence of IL-6, 
glucocorticoids and catecholamines (31,32).
The viral infection induces interferon (IFN) release to 
protect from infection and to inhibit viral replication, 
but influenza virus has mechanisms which counteract 
IFN release. The NS1 protein acts as an antagonist, 
because it works as a scavenger to prevent detection 
of viral RNA (30,31).
The proinflammatory cytokine release causes an in-
flammatory process as well as airway hyperemia o 
bleeding with bronchial hyperreactivity and airway 
obstruction (31,33).
The innate immune response is intended to limit viral 
replication and adaptative immune response through 
antibodies to neutralize the surface proteins of the 
virus yet activation of Th1 lymphocyte is needed for a 
cytotoxic response that eliminates the virus in infected 
cells (31,34).
Clinical and pathological findings in humans
H5N1 virus replicates in the nasal or pharynx epithelium 
and then spreads to the mucous membranes of the re-
spiratory system, but can also be spread throughout the 
body and cause the systemic form of the disease (26).
The clinical feature can range from asymptomatic infec-
tion, minimum alterations of upper and lower airways 
up to multiple organ impairment. Hepatic dysfunction 
and lymphopenia have been shown (12,35).
Sudden onset clinical manifestations include fever 
higher than 39°C, dry cough and rhinorrhea (lower 
respiratory tract symptoms) accompanied by fatigue, 
weakness, myalgia, arthralgia, headache, conjuncti-
vitis, chest pain, dyspnea, pain abdominal, irritability, 
diarrhea, vomiting, pleuritic pain and nasal bleeding, 
Figure 2 (12).
Patient with severe influenza A H5N1 infection might 
progress through a pathogenic pathway distinct from 
that of the usual human subtypes H1-H3. Replication of 
influenza A H5N1 in the human respiratory tract might 
have a potential to trigger a stage of hypercytokinemia 
and complicated with hemophagocytic syndrome (36).
In the early days and while the number of people 
affected is small, patients with suspected influenza A 
H5N1 virus should be hospitalized in order to isolate 
them and to establish clinical monitoring, diagnosis 
and antiviral treatment (37).
Diagnosis
For case detection, the presence of cough and fever 
has good predictive value. The laboratory confirmation 
of infection with the H5N1 virus requires at least one 
of the following positive results: isolation of the virus, 
RT-PCR for H5N1 A virus RNA, immunofluorescence 
test for antigen detection using monoclonal antibodies 
against H5, and at least a 4-fold increase in specific 
antibody titers (38,39).
Documented case records indicate that chest radiogra-
phy is essential in the initial examination. Chest X-ray 
may reveal bilateral interstitial infiltrate, lobar collapse, 
consolidation and air bronchogram without pleural 
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effusion. However, none of these changes, either alone 
or together, is specific for influenza infection (7).
The major hematologic findings in H5N1 patients are 
anemia (hemoglobin <12 g/dL) in 30% of patients, 
leukopenia (WBC <4 x 109/L) in 60%, neutropenia 
(neutrophils <1.5 x 109/L) in 62.5%, lymphopenia 
(lymphocytes <1.5 x 109/L) in 50%, and 60% throm-
bocytopenia (platelets <150 x 109/L).
Within the parameters studied, it was found that anemia 
is not associated with mortality, whereas leukopenia, 
neutropenia, lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia if 
they were predictors of a poor prognosis (40).
Treatment
There are two antiviral classes available for treatment 
of H5N1: M2 inhibitors (amantadine and rimanta-
dine), and neuraminidase inhibitors (zanamivir and 
oseltamivir). M2 inhibitors act by blocking the virus 
within the cell; they are only effective against influenza 
A virus, are associated with a number of toxic effects 
and resistance; moreover, this resistance is genetically 
stable and transmitted to susceptible contacts which 
limits their use (18).
Neuraminidase inhibitors (zanamivir and oseltamivir) 
interfere with the release of influenza virus progeny 
from infected cells, which prevents infection of new cells 
and reduces the spread of the virus in the respiratory 
system. Unlike M2 inhibitors, neuraminidase inhibitors 
exhibit less toxicity and induce less resistance, they are 
effective against all subtypes of neuroaminidasas and 
all types of influenza virus, including H5N1, however, 
the antigenic drift can occur in the NA and mutations 
can condition its use (18,28).
 
In patients infected in the 1997 outbreak, treatment 
with corticosteroids (methylprednisolone, 5 mg/kg/d) 
and antiviral agents (oseltamivir, 75 mg twice daily or 
ribavirin, 400 to 800 mg three times daily) seemed inef-
fective. Six out of seven patients receiving corticosteroids 
died and 80% of patients receiving oseltamivir died as 
well. Some patients required mechanical ventilation, 
especially in the first two days of the illness (41).
Genetic sequencing of the H5N1 subtype isolated in 
five patients in 2004 showed resistance to amantadine 
and rimantadine; moreover, susceptibility testing for 
oseltamivir has shown sensitivity of the virus to the 
drug (7).
For management of bacterial coinfection, especially with 
Staphylococcus aureus, early use of broad spectrum 
antibiotics is advisable (28).
Prevention
Vaccination is the primary strategy for preventing a 
pandemic as well as antiviral prophylaxis and epide-
miological surveillance (42).
Some vaccines against H5 antigens have shown little 
immunogenicity and have required high doses of HA 
or the combination with the adjuvant MF59 or HT for 
generating a neutralizing antibody response. One of 
these vaccines is based on inactivated H5N1 strains 
isolated in 2004, which in practice can lead to the 
administration of two doses of vaccine. Vaccination is 
the primary strategy for preventing influenza. There are 
probably a number of scenarios in which other measures 
such as antivirals must be used, which strategically 
applied can have an important role in reducing the 
impact of the pandemic and slowing its spread (18,43).
The vaccine should be able to induce cross-protection 
against antigenic variants and, in addition, protection in 
the event that the virus causing the pandemic continues 
to mutate. For better performance and improved an-
tigenic immune response, a pharmaceutical company 
has formulated its H5N1 vaccine with an adjuvant 
system called AS03. The AS03 adjuvant system consists 
of an emulsion of oil in water with a known immuno-
modulator, Vitamin E (alpha-tocopherol), in order to 
maximize the immunological benefits (16).
It is well established that water-oil emulsions can in-
duce high antibody concentrations when mixed with a 
certain antigen, and trigger the secretion of cytokines, 
thereby enhancing the recruitment of cells of the innate 
immune system. A couple of vaccines have been de-
veloped to address the pandemic and a pre-pandemic 
scenario (Pandemrix, Prepandrix, GlaxoSmithKline 
Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium) both approved in the 
European Union in May 2008 for active immunization 
against the A/H5N1 flu virus in adults aged between 18 
and 60 years, and recently (May 2009) in adults over 
60 years of age. The recommended dosage is 0.5 ml 
containing 3.75 mcg of HA administered at an interval of 
at least 21 days. Safety data include more than 10,000 
subjects who received the AS03-adjuvanted H5N1 
vaccine, mostly recruited in large studies conducted 
in Europe and Asia (16).
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Discussion and conclusions
In late 2011, the scientific community had general 
knowledge of the findings from research in H5N1 in-
fluenza virus and its transmissibility among mammals 
associated with mutations in the HA gene. The receptor 
molecule for H5N1 avian influenza is the Siaα2,3Gal. 
In contrast, human cells from human airway expressed 
the Siaα2,6Gal (24).
The news sparked a broad debate about publishing 
openly or holding scientific information. In December 
2011, the National Science Advisory Board for Bi-
osecurity (NSABB-National Science Advisory Board 
for Biosecurity) independent advisory body to the 
Department of Health and Human Services of the 
United States-USA issued an alert through the news-
letter of the National Institute of Health recommending 
that authors and publishers of Nature and Science 
journals avoid including the methodological details of 
the experiments, making reference to security reasons 
for the possible use of the information for purposes of 
bioterrorism (44).
The researchers conducted by Dr. Ron Fouchier of the 
Erasmus Institute in Holland and Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka 
of the University of Wisconsin, USA, included millions 
of variants of the H5N1 virus by reverse genetics, of 
which only one was able to recognize the human rather 
than the avian receptor. This variant had the following 
changes: glutamine by a leucine (Q226L) and an as-
paragine for a lysine (N224K); then they merged the 
HA mutated gene with H1N1 virus (24,25).
Ferrets (mammalian model of choice for studying influ-
enza virus) were infected with H5N1-H1N1 hybrid virus. 
After six days, the researchers realized that they had 
acquired a third mutation, asparagine for an aspartic 
acid (N158D). After the researchers infected mice with 
the triple mutant strain they found that the virus could 
infect ferrets by airborne transmission in some nearby 
cages. Some of these viruses had a fourth mutation, a 
threonine for an isoleucine (T318I) (24,25).
None of the infected ferrets died; this strain called 
H5HA/H1N1 was sensitive to oseltamivir and when 
the rate of dispersion among these was measured, it 
was slower than that of H1N1 (25).
It is not clear whether the virus could spread among 
humans as it did among the ferrets. However, the four 
mutations are necessary for adhesion to human cells, 
three mutations alter the adhesion properties of the HA 
and the fourth stabilizes the receptor binding capacity 
(24,41), besides, the different values of body tempera-
ture could act as an enabling mechanism for Influenza 
virus infection through an adaptative mechanism of the 
virions in the species susceptible to infection, including 
human beings (45).
Prior to the publication of the first of two researches over 
H5N1, the debate was opened between scientists and 
bureaucrats about the impact of the research results. 
The first who made his contribution to the discussion 
was one of the group leaders, Dr. Kawaoka, indicating 
that the paper was aimed at containing the risk of the 
possible spread of H5N1 between humans; however 
in January 2012 he declared a moratorium of 60 days 
indicating the urgency to continue working with the 
virus and publication the results (2).
Simultaneously, the group of Dr. Fouchier joined 
the 60-day pause in working with both the H5N1 
virus in the laboratory and on animals (46). In an 
interview published in Science, Dr. Fouchier said 
that in addition to identifying particular mutations, 
the most striking aims to establish the mechanism by 
which the influenza virus infects cells; he added that 
manipulation and generation of mutant strains with 
potential for airborne transmission among mammals 
is not easy (47,48).
In April 2012, the discussion was extended to the 
funding, control and monitoring of research projects 
representing potentially harmful effects on human 
health (49).
The coexistence of circulating influenza viruses has 
given evidence on the evolutionary biology of these 
microorganisms. The AH1N1/2009 variant proved to 
be a recombinant strain of avian, human and swine 
influenza virus; experimental evidence of work with 
H5N1 shortened a path of adaptability that would occur 
naturally between strains. Here it is important to recall 
that the human immunodeficiency virus emerged from 
a strain of primate origin.
The influenza virus is known for its genetic variants 
particularly in the HA and NA proteins, processes that 
are closely related to both mutations as recombinant 
process between circulating variants. Its seasonal pattern 
and pandemic potential in 1889, 1918, 1957, 1968 
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and 2009 is also remarkable. Kawaoka mentioned 
that it is relevant for humanity to recognize these 
possible variations, in particular those involving risk 
of pandemic (2).
It is of interest not only the recognition of these vari-
ants to prepare control measures but also the isolation 
methods, infection model, and drug resistance until 
vaccine development. Although the information could 
be considered risky because of its potential use in the 
construction of a biological weapon, it is also known that 
generation of these mutant strains is highly demanding 
in laboratory conditions.
The knowledge regarding the biology and impact of 
influenza viruses has been recognized by humanity over 
time throughout pandemics of the twentieth century, 
likewise the development of vaccines for seasonal and 
non-seasonal virus and emergence of oseltalmivir resis-
tance (50,51). For that reason, new information about 
this virus should be considered not only of scientific 
interest but also of interest to public health, so there 
should be no restriction. Governments should consider 
using this information to protect their populations from 
the impact of changes that could occur naturally in 
the biology of influenza virus even without any direct 
human intervention.
Although current H3N2 or H1N1 vaccines may protect 
against a virus similar to H5HA/H1N1, the continuous 
evolution of influenza reinforces the need to prepare and 
update the vaccines to all possible variants, strengthen 
basic and applied research allowing elucidating particular 
aspects of influenza virus transmissibility yet going one 
step ahead of this prevalent infectious agent despite 
poor transmissibility to humans (52).
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Figure 1. Morbidity and mortality in Humans by Influenza H5N1 virus (1).
Figure 2. Comparison between 1997 and 2004 of the most frequent clinical presentation symptoms in Human H5N1Influenza infection (12, 40).
